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NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA: CAN THE TRIBES TURN ANOTHER 
ADDICTION INTO AFFLUENCE? 
Melinda Smith* 
Introduction 
For decades, Congress has enacted legislation without a fleeting thought 
of the impact it will have on Native Americans. Today is no different. 
Federal decriminalization of marijuana, with the apparent end-goal of 
federal taxation of marijuana, is on the horizon. The multi-billion dollar 
industry is not only home to large corporate interests, it has been an 
abundant source for the startup of the ever idealized small businesses of 
America. Unsurprisingly public opinion favoring decriminalization of 
marijuana is at an all time high.  
This comment explores the possibility of tribal involvement1 in the 
thriving and ever-growing marijuana industry, and seeks to answer when, if 
ever, it may be economically feasible for the tribes to enter the marijuana 
market from a legal perspective. This article also posits that the same 
restraints of American law that work to prevent tribal nations from enjoying 
lucrative opportunities in the business of marijuana also work to deprive 
tribes of the means to make any meaningful marijuana policy decisions 
within their own communities. Ultimately, the best course of action begins 
with the decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level through 
legislation that expressly states how and when Congress intends the law to 
apply to American Indians. This piece suggests, at the very least, the 
enactment of a comprehensive piece of legislation that specifically 
addresses the legal consequences and internal conflicts that result from the 
application of ambiguous federal law to both sovereign Indian Nations and 
sovereign states. This comment further proposes that Congress seize this 
opportunity to create a framework under which federally recognized tribes 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. The scope of this comment is limited to the “official activities of federally 
recognized Tribes” within “Indian Country.” The legal ambiguity of classification within 
these terms is extensive and beyond the consideration of the present piece.  
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will have a chance to attain economic independence through meaningful 
participation in a growing American industry.  
Part I discusses the history and current status of marijuana law in the 
United States, including the Controlled Substances Act, the Consolidated 
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, state decriminalization 
and regulation of marijuana, the policies of the Department of Justice, 
marijuana related issues raised in Indian Country, and the legal difficulties 
faced by those in an industry prohibited by federal statute. Part II examines 
possible models for tribal involvement in the marijuana industry by 
examining the current status and continuing viability of Indian gaming, 
tobacco, and hemp production. Part III gives an overview of proposed 
federal legislation to end the federal prohibition of marijuana, tax 
marijuana, and, less ambitiously, exclude industrial hemp from the 
definition of marijuana within the Controlled Substances Act. Part IV 
analyzes tribal involvement in the marijuana industry under both the 
Controlled Substances Act and proposed federal legislation with an 
emphasis on ambiguities likely to fuel litigation in the absence of express 
congressional intent. Finally, Part V provides a new model for legislative 
and judicial policy within the federal government regarding marijuana that 
adequately and sufficiently balances state, federal, and tribal interests. 
I. A Brief History of Marijuana Law and Policy 
Although possession, manufacture, and sale of marijuana are illegal 
under federal law,2 decriminalization is on the rise among states3 where the 
industry has substantially spurred the economic growth of state treasuries 
and private businesses alike.4 Those charged with enforcing the federal 
marijuana prohibition have recently been acquiescent, but the possibility 
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) may seek criminal recourse, or that 
the United States might sue to enjoin the implementation of state regulation 
preempted by federal law, leaves the legal future of the marijuana industry 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, Title II, § 102, 84 Stat. 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 801-889 (2012)). 
3. See infra Part I.B.   
 4. Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, Next Gold Rush: Legal Marijuana Feeds Entrepreneurs’ 
Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014, http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/us/new-gold-rush-
legal-marijuana-feeds-entrepreneurs-dreams.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&ver 
sion=HpSum&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=5&re 
ferrer. The industry is projected to grow $2.6 billion this year. Id. 
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in the dark.5 In an effort to cash in on recent events, federal legislation to 
decriminalize and tax marijuana has been proposed, but has yet to be 
enacted.6 
A. The Controlled Substances Act 
The use and sale of marijuana became federally prohibited in 1970 when 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act,7 commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).8 The act 
classifies certain substances into one of five schedules based on “potential 
for abuse”9 and “currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States.”10 Congress categorizes “[m]arihuana” as a Schedule I narcotic.11 
Today, this unaltered classification continues to federally prohibit doctors 
from prescribing marijuana,12 and provides a number of felony penalties for 
the manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana.13 Penalties for 
simple possession of marijuana range from civil penalties14 to felony 
criminal penalties.15 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Sam Karmin, Cooperative Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1105 (2014). 
 6. See H.R. 4046, 113th Cong. (2014) (amending Office of National Drug Control 
Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 by striking provisions which prohibit the Director of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy from studying the legalization of marijuana and 
requires the Director to oppose any attempt to legalize marijuana); H.R. 499, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (decriminalizing marijuana on the federal level, leaving states “a power to regulate 
marijuana that is similar to the power they have to regulate alcohol”); H.R. J. Res. 79, 113th 
Cong. (imposing a 50% federal tax on the sale of marijuana, by the producer or importer 
thereof); H.R. 5226, 113th Cong. (2014) (“Charlotte's Web Medical Hemp Act of 2014” 
amending the Controlled Substances Act to exclude therapeutic hemp and cannabidiol from 
the definition of marihuana). 
 7. 21 U.S.C §§ 801-889 (2012). 
 8. See Karmin, supra note 5. 
 9. See 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Karmin, supra note 5, at 1106. 
 13. 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
 14. Id. § 844a. In assessing civil penalties the Attorney General has defined “Personal 
Use Amount” as “possession of controlled substances in circumstances where there is no 
other evidence of an intent to distribute, or to facilitate the manufacturing, compounding, 
processing, delivering, importing or exporting of any controlled substance.” 28 C.F.R. § 76.2 
(2014). Relevant evidence of a lack of this intent is the possession of a mixture or substance 
containing detectable amounts of marijuana that does not exceed “one ounce.” Id. 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 844.  
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Not all enumerated controlled substances are illegal in every context, in 
fact many of the substances are permitted in legitimate medical, scientific 
and commercial channels. For example, Vicodin, a schedule II narcotic, 
commonly prescribed to alleviate pain, may be possessed and ingested by a 
person that has a valid prescription from a licensed physician. Under the 
CSA, the Attorney General is authorized to “assist State, tribal, and local 
governments in suppressing the diversion of controlled substances” from 
legitimate channels into illegal channels and may make grants to these 
governments to assist in meeting the costs of improving anti-diversion 
regulatory controls.16 The Attorney General is similarly authorized to “enter 
into contractual agreements with State, tribal, and local law enforcement 
agencies to provide for cooperative enforcement” of the CSA.17 
In lieu of legislative amendment or repeal, the CSA likewise authorizes 
the Attorney General to remove substances from the established schedules, 
by rules promulgated in accordance with the procedures set out in the Act, 
should he or she find that the substance fails to “meet the requirements for 
inclusion in any schedule.”18 The Attorney General may promulgate a rule 
to remove a listed substance if the substance’s potential for abuse is 
outweighed by the substance’s accepted medical use.19 In making this 
determination, the Attorney General must consider: (1) the drug's actual or 
relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evidence of its pharmacological 
effects, if known; (3) the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the 
drug or other substance; (4) its history and current pattern of abuse; (5) the 
scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) what, if any, risk there is to 
the public health; (7) its psychological or physiological dependence 
liability; and (8) whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a 
controlled substance.20 
The CSA provides that it shall not preempt state law “unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. § 873(a), (d). In addition to grants, the AG may assist by: 
 (A) making periodic assessments of the capabilities of State, tribal, and 
local governments to adequately control the diversion of controlled substances; 
 (B) providing advice and counsel to State, tribal, and local governments on 
the methods by which such governments may strengthen their controls against 
diversion; and 
 (C) establishing cooperative investigative efforts to control diversion . . . . 
Id. § 873(a)(6). 
 17. Id. § 873(a)(7). 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/3
No. 2] COMMENTS 511 
 
 
law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”21 Given that this 
provision was simply intended to provide concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction for criminal prosecution under both federal and state law, it is 
unlikely Congress contemplated that this would be as controversial as it has 
proven to be.22  
In interpreting this provision, courts have generally established that a 
state medical marijuana law is in “positive conflict” with the CSA if it is 
“physically impossible” to comply with both the state and federal law, or 
where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”23  
In Gonzales v. Raich,24 a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
“the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to prohibit the wholly intrastate 
possession and use of marijuana.”25 However, the Court failed to consider 
whether the CSA preempted the state law at issue,26 leaving the question of 
the effect of the Supremacy Clause unanswered. 
B. State Decriminalization and Regulation of Marijuana 
In 2013, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued a memorandum to all 
U.S. Attorneys announcing that although the DOJ retains the power and 
conviction to enforce the CSA, it will leave marijuana law enforcement to 
the local authorities if the states carefully regulate the marijuana market in 
accordance with federal priorities.27 In order to tentatively avoid 
prosecution and enjoinment for violating the CSA, a state’s marijuana 
regulatory scheme must include legal and enforcement mechanisms that 
adequately address the following eight federal priorities: (1) preventing the 
distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing revenue from the sale of 
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3) 
preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 22. See, e.g., People v. Sheppard, 432 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 23. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 
(2012) (referencing the differing holdings between Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau 
of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518 (Or. 2010), and County of San Diego v. San Diego Norml, 
165 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2008)). 
 24. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 25. See GARVEY, supra note 23, at 5 (citing Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1). 
 26. Id.  
 27. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
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state law in some form to other states; (4) preventing drugged driving (5) 
preventing the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences 
associated with marijuana use; (6) preventing the growing of marijuana on 
public lands; (7) preventing the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and (8) preventing 
marijuana possession or use on federal property.28 
To date, the use of marijuana for medical purposes has been 
decriminalized in twenty-three states29 and the District of Columbia.30 
Seventeen other states have approved non-comprehensive medical 
marijuana programs where, for example, the state permits only the use of 
products that are less psychoactive than recreational marijuana, meaning the 
products contain low amounts of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and contain 
high amounts of cannabidiol (CBD).31 In 2012, Colorado32 and 
Washington33 enacted legislation decriminalizing the recreational use of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. These same eight guidelines apply to the growth and use of marijuana in Indian 
Country under a similar memorandum issued by the DOJ on October 28, 2014. See infra 
note 45. 
 29. States with comprehensive legislation legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes 
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See State Medical 
Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.  
 30. Prior to 2014, twenty-one states and D.C. had decriminalized and regulated 
medicinal marijuana in some way. Id. In 2014, New York and Minnesota joined the ranks. 
Id. There is widespread global advocacy for the medicinal use of marijuana. Quick 
Reference, NORML, http://norml.org/marijuana/item/quick-reference?category_id=734 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2014) (providing a list of health organization that support immediate legal 
access to medical marijuana). 
 31. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 29. Recent Research suggests that the 
medicinal benefits of non-psychoactive CBD include the reduction of anxiety, nausea, 
seizure activity, tumors and cancer cells. 5 Must-Know Facts About Cannabidiol (CBD), 
LEAF SCIENCE (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.leafscience.com/2014/02/23/5-must-know-facts-
cannabidiol-cbd/. 
 32. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (“[T]he following acts are not unlawful and shall not 
be an offense under Colorado law or the law of any locality within Colorado or be a basis for 
seizure or forfeiture of assets under Colorado law for persons twenty-one years of age or 
older . . . [p]ossessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana accessories 
or one ounce or less of marijuana.”). 
 33. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.4013 (West 2014) (“The possession, by a person 
twenty-one years of age or older, of useable marijuana or marijuana-infused products in 
amounts that do not exceed those set forth in RCW 69.50.360(3) is not a violation of this 
section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington state law.”). 
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marijuana by adults over the age of twenty-one. Similar measures to 
legalize recreational marijuana passed in Alaska34 and Oregon35 in 
November of 2014.36  
 
C. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 201537 
 In December of 2014, Congress strengthened the administration’s 
implied promise to decline federal prosecution under the CSA for the sale 
of medicinal marijuana by providing that DOJ funds cannot be used to 
enforce the federal marijuana prohibition in states which have legalized 
medical marijuana.38 In the same appropriations act, Congress made an 
additional implied policy statement regarding hemp production, by 
preventing the DOJ and Drug Enforcement Administration from using 
appropriated funds to prosecute those institutions of higher education and 
state departments of agriculture that have been authorized to grow hemp for 
research or establish agricultural pilot programs under the Legitimacy of 
Industrial Hemp Research section of the Agricultural Act of 2014.39 
D. Indian Country: Monkey in the Middle 
The registration requirements40 and civil penalties41 of the CSA apply to 
“any person,” and arguably as a function of the Supremacy Clause,42 apply 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Marijuana_Legalization,_Ballot_Measure_2_%282014%29 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (“As a result of its passage, the measure allowed people age 21 and 
older to possess up to one ounce of marijuana and up to six plants. It also made the 
manufacture, sale and possession of marijuana paraphernalia legal.”). 
 35. Noelle Crombie, Marijuana legalization Q&A: What's Next for Oregon?, 
OREGONLIVE (Nov. 05, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/ 
2014/11/marijuana_legalization_oregon.html (“[In July of 2015] [p]eople 21 and older will 
be allowed to possess up to 1 ounce of marijuana in a public place and up to 8 ounces in 
their home. The law also allows up to four marijuana plants per household.”). 
 36. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4.  
 37. Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130. 
 38. Id. tit. V, § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217. 
 39. Id. at tit. V, § 539, 128 Stat. at 2217. The Legitimacy of Industrial Hemp Research 
section requires that sites used for growing or cultivating industrial hemp be in states where 
hemp is legal and certified by, and registered with, the State department of agriculture. 7 
U.S.C. § 5940(a) (2012). 
 40. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(1) (2012) (“Every person who 
manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical, or who proposes to 
engage in the manufacture or distribution of any controlled substance or list I chemical, shall 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
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to all tribal members, even those in states which have assumed criminal 
jurisdiction over tribal land within the state.43 However the CSA does not 
appear to apply to the official activities of the tribes themselves, leaving 
them with their sovereign power, buttressed by immunity from suit, to enact 
tribal ordinances that differ from the CSA.44  
In 2014, in response to “requested guidance on the enforcement of the 
Controlled Substance Act (CSA) on tribal lands by the United States 
Attorneys’ offices,”45 the DOJ issued a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys, 
Assistant Attorneys, Criminal Chiefs, Appellate Chiefs, Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Force Coordinators and Tribal Liaisons stating 
that, on a case-by-case basis, the “eight priorities in the Cole Memorandum 
will guide United States Attorneys’ marijuana enforcement efforts in Indian 
Country, including in the event that sovereign Indian Nations seek to 
legalize the cultivation or use of marijuana in Indian Country.”46 The 
memo further provides that “[c]onsistent with the Attorney General’s 2010 
Indian Country Initiative,” U.S. Attorneys should consult with tribes on a 
government-to-government basis when evaluating a tribe’s marijuana 
                                                                                                                 
obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General in accordance with the rules 
and regulations promulgated by him.”). 
 41. See Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly or intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”). 
 42. See GARVEY, supra note 23. 
 43. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) 
(holding that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their 
property interests”); Vandever v. Osage Nation Enter., Inc., No. 06-CV-380-GKF-SAJ, 2007 
WL 6139198, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2007) (“This general rule, known as the Tuscarora 
rule, ‘presumes that when Congress enacts a statute of general applicability, the statute 
reaches everyone within federal jurisdiction not specifically excluded, including Indians and 
Tribes.’ Broad application of the Tuscarora rule, however, has been whittled down over the 
years.”) (internal citations omitted); see Robin Lash, Industrial Hemp: The Crop for the 
Seventh Generation, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313, 344 (2002-2003). 
 44. See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Ordinance No. 98-27 (July 28, 1998), 
available at https://www.votehemp.com/PDF/OrdinanceNo9827.pdf; United States v. White 
Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2006) (demonstrating that the United States acts to 
enjoin individual members of a tribe from violating the CSA while avoiding the issue of the 
tribe’s authority to pass an ordinance in direct contradiction with the CSA).  
 45. See Monty Wilkinson, Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy 
Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystateme
ntregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry2.pdf.  
 46. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). For the Cole Memorandum standards, see discussion 
supra Part I.B. 
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enforcement activities, and should inform the executive before making any 
determination on how to proceed when tribal regulation does not meet the 
eight Cole Memorandum standards.47 The 2014 memorandum was not the 
first instance of a federal Native American exemption from the CSA; the 
Native American Church has received an exemption allowing peyote use—
a Schedule I narcotic—for the past forty-three years.48 In 1994, Congress 
further exempted “the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an 
Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the 
practice of a traditional Indian religion” from the CSA’s criminal 
penalties,49 providing that such activity shall not be prohibited by the 
United States or any State.50 
The impact of the memorandum in Indian Country is not immediately 
clear. At least one tribe, the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge Reservation in 
South Dakota, has taken steps toward legalization of marijuana on the 
reservation. In 2015 the Wounded Knee district of the Pine Ridge 
Reservation passed a motion legalizing “the sale of medicinal and 
recreational marijuana as well as industrialized hemp” but the remaining 
nine districts and the tribal council have yet to weigh in on the issue.51 In 
addition, a recent Indian Country Today Media Network article claims that 
some tribal members are currently cultivating, using, and selling 100% 
organic marijuana on a rancheria in Northern California.52 One of the 
anonymous tribal members growing marijuana on the reservation stated that 
he was a recovering alcoholic and meth addict, and that smoking marijuana 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Wilkinson, supra note 45, at 2-3.  
 48. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433 
(2006) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2005)). 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012). 
 50. Id. (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or 
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be 
prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated 
against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, 
denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 51. Brandon Ecoffey, Oglala Sioux District Endorses Marijuana, LAKOTA COUNTRY 
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2015, http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/017115.asp; see also Joe 
O'Sullivan, Pine Ridge Reservation Considers Legalizing Marijuana, RAPID CITY J., Feb. 2, 
2014, 5:00 AM, http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/pine-ridge-reservation-considers-
legalizing-marijuana/article_af9b0f7c-cb6b-504a-a11a-6e8da8005087.html. 
 52. See Ruth Hopkins, Cannabis on the Rez: When Will It Be Legal?, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Apr. 25, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2014/04/25/cannabis-rez-when-will-it-be-legal.  
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prevented him from relapsing.53 When asked how so much marijuana could 
be illegally grown, he pointed out that the rancheria is located in California, 
a Public Law 280 (PL 280) state where, in the absence of tribal law 
enforcement, state law enforcement was lax.54 A second grower discussed 
his hopes for promoting tribal sovereignty through tribal taxation of 
marijuana produced and sold on the reservation, and was actively lobbying 
his tribal council to legalize cannabis so that the tribe could have its own 
nursery.55 Dismayed at the wasteful agricultural methods of other marijuana 
producers, he also hoped to teach others how to grow marijuana in a more 
environmentally friendly way, specifically more efficient water irrigation 
systems and safer waste disposal methods.56 
Conversely, many Native Americans remain staunchly opposed to tribal 
legalization of marijuana, even while supporting federal 
decriminalization.57 For example, Troy A. Eid, chair of the National Indian 
Law and Order Commission, recently authored an opinion piece discussing 
the detrimental effects of diversion into tribal communities and concluding 
that “[o]nly federally authorized decriminalization of marijuana that 
respects the prerogatives of states and tribes can ensure a concerted national 
enforcement strategy against marijuana diversion.”58  
In Indian communities in those states where marijuana is legal under 
state law, tribal courts struggle to balance tribal, state, and federal law.59 
For example, in the Swimosh Indian Tribal Community, located in 
Washington, under the Swimosh Code, “‘if there is . . . any doubt as to 
whether a substance is illegal or not’ the tribal court may turn to [the laws 
of the state of Washington] for guidance.”60 In addition, under Swimosh 
law, “[a]n independent sovereign may fully incorporate by reference the 
laws of another sovereign.”61 Despite these attempts at uniformity among 
state and tribal criminal law, the incongruence with federal law creates an 
interesting conundrum. Under Washington state law, the possession of 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Troy A. Eid, Indian Youth Hurt by Colorado's Marijuana Experiment, DENVER 
POST, July 26, 2014, 5:01 PM, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_26216404/indian-
youth-hurt-by-colorados-marijuana-experiment. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. See, e.g., Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. McLeod, 11 Am. Tribal Law 187 
(2012). 
 60. Id. at 188 (citing SWINOMISH TRIBAL CODE 4.10.020(B)). 
 61. Id. at 189 (citing Wiley v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 2 C.C.A.R. 60 (1995)). 
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certain amounts of marijuana is authorized for those with a written 
authorization for medical use of marijuana from a medical provider.62 
Under Swimosh law possession of marijuana is authorized only for those 
with a valid prescription from a medical provider.63 However, as the tribal 
court in Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. McLeod points out, 
“[m]arijuana . . . may not be prescribed under Federal law,”64 and therefore 
its possession remains illegal under the tribal statute. 
E. The Persistent Legal Consequences of Federal Half-Measures 
Despite the DOJ’s declarations that U.S. Attorneys will likely turn a 
blind eye to marijuana use if decriminalizing states and tribes maintain a 
tight ship, and a 2015 federal appropriations act that ensures the DOJ will 
not prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws, in the 
shadow of uncertainty cast by the CSA, significant challenges continue to 
plague the $1.5 billion marijuana industry.65 Notably, courts may deem a 
contract for a cannabis-related transaction, including business loan 
agreements, to be void as against public or federal policy because marijuana 
remains a federally prohibited Schedule I narcotic.66 Because contract law 
applies to tribal-state compacts, which serve to enforce agreements between 
tribes and states in the areas of self-governance, taxation, and criminal 
jurisdiction,67 cannabis related compacts would likely face similar barriers 
to enforceability in a court of law.68 Banks and other financial institutions 
often refuse to do business with the marijuana industry for fear of federal 
prosecution for money laundering,69 and adequate legal advice may be hard 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 188. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4.  
 66. Karmin, supra note 5, at 1113.  
 67. See Jeff Corntassel, Indigenous Governance Amidst the Forced Federalism Era, 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2009). 
 68. See, e.g., Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 69. Id. The threat of prosecution for money laundering has rendered the marijuana 
business a cash-only business, making it a target for violent crime. Id. “A financial 
institution that knowingly processes transactions for marijuana-related businesses commits 
the crime of money laundering.” Jacob Sullem, Marijuana Money Is Still a Pot of Trouble 
for Banks, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2014, 5:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/ 
2014/09/18/local-banks-terrified-by-friendly-neighborhood-marijuana-merchants/ (quoting 
Julie Anderson Hill, J.D.). However, 
[t]he Obama administration on [Feb. 14, 2014] issued new law-enforcement 
guidelines aimed at encouraging banks to start doing business with state-
licensed marijuana suppliers . . . . 
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to come by because rules of professional conduct prohibit legal counsel 
from “knowingly facilitating criminal conduct.”70  
In addition to these inherent legal complications, those involved in the 
marijuana industry incur substantial expenses, payable to the state, in 
licensing fees71 and taxes.72 For example, “Colorado voters approved a 15% 
excise tax on marijuana producers . . . and a 10% special sales tax on 
consumers.”73  
Finally, the discord between states which have legalized marijuana and 
states and tribes which continue to prohibit its production, use, and 
possession, remains an extremely hot political topic that fuels litigation not 
easily resolved in light of the glaring contradiction within the federal 
position on marijuana. The prominent issue is what is known as 
“diversion,”74 the leakage of state-legalized cannabis products into states 
and territories that continue to outlaw marijuana.  
                                                                                                                 
 . . . . 
 The guidance stopped short of promising immunity for banks. But it said 
criminal prosecution for money laundering and other crimes is unlikely if banks 
meet a series of conditions, such as avoiding business with marijuana 
operations that sell to minors or engage in illegal drug trafficking. 
David Ingram & Jason Lange, U.S. to Let Banks Do Business with Licensed Pot Shops, 
REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-usa-marijuana-
banking-idUSBREA1D1I520140215.  
 70. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1116-17. 
 71. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-075 (2015) (“The annual fee for issuance 
and renewal of a marijuana producer license is one thousand dollars.”). 
 72.  Jolie Lee, Colorado Makes $3.5M in Pot Revenue in January, USA TODAY, Mar. 
11, 2014, 11:39 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/03/10/marijua 
na-revenue-colorado-taxes/6261131/. 
 73. Id. 
 74. The prevention of diversion is one of the eight priorities listed on the Cole 
Memorandum, which, in order to avoid prosecution by U.S. Attorneys, those states and 
tribes who wish to legalize marijuana in any form must enforce through an effective 
regulatory scheme. See discussion supra Part I.B. In the context of diversion from states to 
Indian Country, 
[t]he promoters of both [Colorado and Washington measures permitting 
recreational use and sales] vowed that marijuana wouldn't be diverted to places 
where it's still illegal. Places like Pine Ridge, or the Yakima Nation in central 
Washington State. The Washington marijuana initiative, incidentally, exempted 
Yakima and other tribes from state marijuana legalization because Indian 
nations are sovereign — governments entitled to make and enforce their own 
laws that meet the needs of their citizens. Still, Washington-labeled marijuana 
is reportedly showing up at Yakima, too. Tribal leaders are so outraged they 
want to extend their marijuana ban to all areas of Washington State covered by 
the Yakima Nation's original treaty with the United States. 
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For example, in December of 2014, the Attorney Generals of Nebraska 
and Oklahoma filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Supreme Court asking the Court 
to declare Colorado’s legalization of marijuana in violation of the 
Constitution.75 Released to the press, an unsigned and unstamped copy of 
the Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Brief in Support of Motion to File 
Complaint, and Complaint assert that Colorado’s cannabis legalization laws 
are preempted by federal law (the CSA) and thus violate the Supremacy 
Clause.76 As a somewhat secondary argument, the complaint attacks the 
adequacy of Colorado’s regulatory scheme as failing to “ensure marijuana 
cultivated and sold in Colorado is not trafficked to other states.”77 Until the 
federal government solidifies and communicates a consistent federal 
marijuana policy, pro-legalization governmental interests will continue to 
increasingly face off with anti-legalization governmental interests in court 
systems across the country. Although this dispute initially took root in 
highly polarized public opinion concerning drug policy, it is now cultivated 
by the significant financial interests of governmental and private 
commercial interests.  
II. Possible Models for Tribal Marijuana Revenue: Tobacco Sales, Indian 
Gaming, and Industrial Hemp Production 
As of June 2014, total revenue from marijuana taxes, licenses, and fees 
in Colorado “topped 7 million dollars” and is projected “to keep rising as 
more retail outlets enter the market.”78 In contrast, “[t]he poverty and 
unemployment rates on Indian reservations are significantly greater than the 
national average. As a result, ‘there is no stable tax base on most 
                                                                                                                 
Eid, supra note 57. 
 75. John Ingold, Nebraska and Oklahoma Sue Colorado over Marijuana Legalization, 
DENVER POST, Dec. 18, 2014, 1:12 PM, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27163543/ 
nebraska-and-oklahoma-sue-colorado-over-marijuana-legalization?source=infinite.  
 76. Complaint at ¶ 4, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 144 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2014) 
(“The Constitution and the federal anti-drug laws do not permit the development of a 
patchwork of state and local pro-drug policies and licensed-distribution schemes throughout 
the country which conflict with federal laws.”). 
 77. Id. ¶ 5. 
 78. Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Tax Revenues Surge as Recreational 
Sales Surpass Medical, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/11/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenues-surge-as-recreational-sal 
es-surpass-medical-for-the-first-time/. 
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reservations.’”79 With money flowing to the pockets of private industry,80 as 
well as to the twenty-four states and the District of Columbia which have 
legalized marijuana use in the face of federal prohibition,81 it is no surprise 
that some tribal members are considering entering into the “Wild West” 
that is the marijuana industry.82 In analyzing the economic feasibility of 
tribal participation in the marijuana market, it is beneficial to examine the 
successes, failures and mechanics of similar tribal ventures in Indian 
gaming, Indian tobacco and hemp production. 
A. Indian Gaming 
The revenue-generating power of Indian casinos rests on the principles 
of tribal sovereign immunity from the civil regulatory power of the states. 
In the 1980s, “numerous Indian tribes [became] engaged in or [licensed] 
gambling activities in Indian country as a means of generating tribal 
government revenue.”83 In response, many states attempted to prevent tribes 
from engaging in gaming altogether or imposed restrictions on tribal 
gaming.  
Eventually the question of immunity from state regulation reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the influential case California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians,84 in which the Court held “the State's interest in preventing 
the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime d[id] not 
justify state regulation of the tribal bingo enterprises in light of the 
compelling federal and tribal interests supporting [the continued operation 
of the tribal bingo enterprises].”85 Underlying the Court’s decision was the 
distinction between “criminal/prohibitory” and “civil/regulatory” laws in 
PL 280 states.86 The Court reasoned that PL 28087 permitted these states 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (quoting Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as 
a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 774). 
 80. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4. 
 81. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 29.  
 82. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 51. 
 83. Id. at 3. 
 84. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 85. Id. at 221-22. 
 86. Id. at 208 (“[W]hen a State seeks to enforce a law within an Indian reservation 
under the authority of Pub.L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in 
nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under § 2, or civil in nature, and 
applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court.”).  
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2014). “In Pub.L. 280, Congress expressly granted six States, 
including California, jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country within the States and 
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broad criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country within the State, as well as 
civil jurisdiction over private litigation involving reservation Indians in 
state court, but that the statute did not grant general civil regulatory 
authority.88 More recently, the Supreme Court proclaimed that Cabazon 
“held that States lacked regulatory authority over gaming on Indian 
land[s].”89  
Despite this favorable ruling, some tribes expressed concern that their 
tribal regulatory schemes and limited enforcement powers were insufficient 
to adequately protect their gambling operations from “the influence of 
organized crime, racketeers, [and] professional gamblers.”90 In response, 
Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).91 Of notable 
import, the legislative history of the IGRA provides that “tribal operation 
and licensing of gambling activities [was in fact] a legitimate means of 
generating revenues for governmental operations and programs.”92 
The IGRA applies only to gaming on “Indian lands,” which is defined as 
lands within reservation boundaries, lands held in trust, and allotment 
lands.93 The IGRA establishes the National Indian Gaming Commission 
(NIGC) within the Department of the Interior (DOI), which is authorized to 
promulgate regulations, conduct investigations, adjudicate, and approve an 
annual budget for the Commission.94 As the statutory backbone of the 
federal regulatory scheme, the IGRA is predominantly enforced through the 
administrative approval or denial of statutorily requisite tribal ordinances or 
resolutions,95 operational or management contracts to which the tribes are a 
party,96 and tribal-state compacts.97 Tribal ordinances or resolutions must 
                                                                                                                 
provided for the assumption of jurisdiction by other States.” California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). 
 88. Id. at 209. 
 89. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014). 
 90. Indian Gambling Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4566 Before the H. Comm. on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong. 9-10 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4566].  
 91. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2013)). 
 92. Hearing on H.R. 4566, supra note 90, at 9-10.  
 93. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). 
 94. Id. § 2706. Although one might imagine that federal oversight of such a specifically 
tribal activity would be conducted by a branch, division, office, or agency within the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission as a separate 
entity within the Department of the Interior. Id. § 2704. 
 95. Id. § 2710(b). 
 96. Id. §§ 2710(d)(9), 2711(g), 2711(a)(1). “By regulation, unapproved management 
contracts are deemed ‘void.’” Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t. Corp., 547 F.3d 
115, 120 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 25 C.F.R. § 533.7 (2008)). 
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conform to the IGRA and require the approval of the Chairman of the 
NIGC.98 While tribal-state compacts require the approval of the Secretary 
of the Interior, the IGRA transfers the authority to approve gaming related 
management contracts from the Secretary of the Interior to the NIGC.99  
The core regulatory framework of the IGRA divides Indian gaming 
activities into three classes. Class I gaming, which is either traditional 
gaming associated with tribal ceremonies or social gaming for prizes of 
only minimal value,100 enjoys immunity from both state and federal 
regulation.101 Class II gaming, “essentially bingo and certain card games 
can be regulated on Indian lands by states only if those games are 
prohibited for everyone under all circumstances.”102 The real revenue, as 
well as the most substantial risk of unfavorable state regulation, lies in 
Class III gaming, which consists of all forms of gaming not included in 
Class I or II.103 Under the IGRA, the most significant state involvement in 
Class III gaming occurs primarily through two legal avenues: first, the 
drafting and enforcement of tribal-state compacts; and second, federal 
preemption workarounds.  
To engage in Class III gaming, a tribe must first, pass an ordinance or 
resolution to legalize gaming;104 second, be “located in a state that permits 
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity”; and 
third, negotiate a compact agreement between the tribe and the state.105 The 
                                                                                                                 
 97. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A). 
 98. Id. § 2710(b). Tribal ordinances or resolutions must include provisions specifying 
the use of net revenue in accordance with the statutory requirements. Id. 
 99.  Id. § 2711; see also United States ex rel. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Mgmt., Inc., 20 
F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1992)). 
 100. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). 
 101. Kurtis A. Kemper, Preemption of State Law by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27 
A.L.R. FED. 2D 93, § 2 (2008). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(A) (2012). The section provides: 
If any Indian tribe proposes to engage in, or to authorize any person or entity to 
engage in, a class III gaming activity on Indian lands of the Indian tribe, the 
governing body of the Indian tribe shall adopt and submit to the Chairman [of 
the National Gaming Commission] an ordinance or resolution that meets the 
requirements of subsection (b) of this section [which includes conditions on the 
spending of revenue, the requirement of a specific tribal regulatory scheme and 
the imposition of National Gaming Commission audits and oversight]. 
Id. 
 105. Kemper, supra note 101 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2701(d) (2012)). 
Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under [IGRA] may include provisions 
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IGRA section 2701(d)(3)-(9) provides the procedure, scope, and general 
requirements of tribal-state gaming compacts. In sum: 
A tribe seeking to conduct class III gaming on Indian land must 
request that the state negotiate with the tribe in an attempt to 
develop a tribal-state compact. The state must negotiate in good 
faith to enter into a compact, and any tribal-state compact is 
subject to approval by the National Indian Gaming 
Commissioner. It is through the compacting process that the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 et 
seq.) allows states to have input into how class III gaming will 
be conducted—authority that is limited in that if the state does 
not negotiate or fails to negotiate in good faith, a tribe may bring 
suit in federal district court, the parties will be ordered to 
conclude a compact within a 60-day period, if the parties do not 
agree to a compact, mediation is required, and if the state still 
does not agree or invokes its 11th Amendment immunity, the 
Secretary of the Interior and the tribe will decide upon 
procedures for conducting class III gaming.106 
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of state Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under the IGRA in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.107 The 
Seminole Tribe filed suit to compel Florida to negotiate a tribal-state 
                                                                                                                 
relating to: 
 (i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the 
Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the 
licensing and regulation of such activity; 
 (ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the 
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; 
 (iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are 
necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity; 
 (iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to 
amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
 (v) remedies for breach of contract [including waivers of sovereign 
immunity]; 
 (vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the 
gaming facility, including licensing; and 
 (vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming 
activities. 
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).  
 106. Kemper, supra note 101 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7); 
Dalton v. Pataki, 5 N.Y.3d 243 (2005)).  
 107. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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gaming compact in good faith pursuant to the IGRA.108 The Court held that 
not only did Congress lack the authority to abrogate the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is likewise 
unavailable to tribes seeking enforcement of the IGRA’s requirements.109 
Ultimately, a tribe may not compel a state to negotiate under the IGRA’s 
remedial scheme because the state is immune from suit. Because the IGRA 
provides the remedial scheme specifically designed for enforcement of the 
right to compel the state to negotiate, a tribe cannot sue a state official in 
their official capacity to enforce that right under the Ex parte Young 
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.110 
In contrast, the IGRA section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) expressly abrogates tribal 
sovereign immunity for Class III gaming on Indian lands which violates a 
tribal-state compact.111 In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,112 the 
state sought to enjoin a tribe from operating an off-reservation casino that 
the tribe had purchased.113 Michigan contended that the casino was not on 
“Indian lands” for purposes of the IGRA, and as a consequence it violated 
the tribal-state compact that prohibited off-reservation gaming facilities 
within the state.114 The DOI issued an opinion confirming Michigan’s claim 
that because the off-reservation casino could not be converted into a casino 
on “Indian lands” simply because it was purchased by the tribe with Land 
Trust earnings.115 In a nearly comical twist at Michigan’s expense, the 
Court held that the IGRA expressly abrogates tribal sovereign immunity 
only for gaming activities occurring on Indian lands, and thus sovereign 
immunity barred the state from enjoining the tribe from operating the 
casino because it was located off of Indian lands.116  
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. at 51-52. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) authorizes a tribe to bring an action 
to compel negotiations if the state fails to respond in good faith within 180 days of the 
tribe’s request to negotiate.  
 109. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76. 
 110. See id.  
 111. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014); see also 
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (citing the 
provision as an example of federal legislation “restrict[ing] tribal immunity from suit in 
limited circumstances”). 
 112. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014). 
 113. Id. at 2029. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2034 (“Everything—literally everything—in IGRA affords tools (for either 
state or federal officials) to regulate gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere else.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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In the absence of express and unequivocal congressional abrogation,117 
tribal immunity applies whether a suit is brought by a state,118 or arises 
from a tribe's commercial activities off Indian lands.119 Although sovereign 
immunity may protect the tribe itself from suit, individuals120 and entities121 
engaged in Indian gaming enterprises are often not afforded the same 
protections. Individual tribal members are not immune and, unlike state 
officers under the IGRA,122 tribal officers are subject to suit for injunctive 
relief under the Ex Parte Young doctrine.123  
With the foreclosure of IGRA’s enforcement mechanism, the doctrine of 
federal preemption developed as a separate and independent defense against 
interference at the state level,124 but the preemptive scope of IGRA is not 
immediately clear.125  
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 2027 (referencing C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe 
of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)). 
 118. Id. (referencing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 
(1977)). 
 119. Id. (referencing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 
(1988)). 
 120. Id. at 2035 (“[A]nalogizing to Ex parte Young, tribal immunity does not bar such a 
suit for injunctive relief against individuals, including tribal officers, responsible for 
unlawful conduct.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 121.  See Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
settled law of our circuit is that tribal corporations acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the 
same sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself. . . . whether tribal immunity extends to a 
tribal business entity depends [on] . . . whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that 
its activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribe.”) (citations omitted). 
 122. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). 
 123. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2035 (2014). 
 124. See, e.g., Great W. Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 828, 831 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that state law claims against the tribe, its tribal council, 
the individual tribal council members, numerous individual tribal members, counsel for the 
tribe, a law firm, and a member of that firm were barred by the separate and independent 
grounds of federal preemption and sovereign immunity). 
 125.  For example IGRA’s legislative history suggests that IGRA is “intended to 
expressly preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands.” See 
Kemper, supra note 101, § 2 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-446 (1988)) (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, § 1166(a) of the United States Code expressly provides that “all State laws 
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited 
to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 
1166(a) (2012). Yet a careful reading reveals that approved class III gaming is not subject to 
such state laws because approved class III gaming activities are not considered “gambling” 
for purposes of the federal statute. Id. § 1166(c). 
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In addition, PL 280, enacted before the IGRA, confers broad criminal 
jurisdiction to certain states over Indian Country within astate.126 However, 
the IGRA maintains that the federal government has “exclusive jurisdiction 
over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws . . . unless 
an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact . . . has consented to the 
transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the 
lands of the Indian tribe.”127 A majority of authority recognizes that in all 
states, including PL 280 states,128 in the absence of a tribal-state compact to 
the contrary,129 the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
prosecutions of violations of state gambling laws that occur on Indian 
lands,130 but not for those violations that occur in Indian gaming facilities 
located outside of Indian lands.131 
Beyond the confounds of the IGRA’s statutory construction, “[i]n 
determining whether federal law preempts a state's authority to regulate 
gaming activities on tribal lands, different standards apply than in other 
areas of federal preemption.”132 Specifically, the IGRA preempts those 
disputes and state regulations that threaten or interfere with federal and 
tribal interests,133 unless the tribe has consented to state regulation by tribal-
                                                                                                                 
 126. See id. § 1162. 
 127. Id. § 1166(d). 
 128. See Lac du Flambeau Band v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990) 
(determining that Wisconsin had lost its PL 280 authority to prosecute Indian gambling after 
the passage of IGRA). 
 129. See Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1273 (D. Kan. 2004) 
(“The structure of the IGRA permits assertion of state civil or criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian gaming only when a tribal-state compact has been reached to regulate Class III 
gaming.”); Lac du Flambeau Band v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990) 
(“Unless and until the state negotiates a tribal-state compact in which [the tribe] consents to 
the exercise of such jurisdiction, the United States has the exclusive authority to enforce 
violations of state gambling laws on plaintiffs' reservations . . . .”). 
 130. “IGRA limits the state's regulatory authority to that expressly agreed upon in a 
compact. Outside the express provisions of a compact, the enforcement of IGRA's 
prohibitions on class III gaming remains the exclusive province of the federal government.” 
Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (D. Or. 2005) (citing Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 131. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 132. 116 AM. JUR. Trials 395 (2010). “Even state law passed in accordance with a state's 
police power is held inoperative where it impairs or obstructs the exercise of any power 
which the federal government possesses.” 2 J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 36:8 (7th ed. 2007) (citing Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 
U.S. 325 (1973)). 
 133. 116 AM. JUR. Trials 395; see, e.g., Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 788 
F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (“[A] finding of preemption does not require an 
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state compact134 or if the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the 
assertion of state authority.135 
The IGRA’s statutory language does not expressly prohibit a state’s 
power to tax. The trend has been to apply traditional jurisprudence 
concerning state taxation of tribal activities and land,136 rather than to apply 
the preemption doctrine as a bar to the imposition of all state taxes.137 For 
example, when the gaming facility is located on land held in trust, the 
gaming related income of tribal members who live within Indian Country is 
exempt from state income tax whereas the same income of tribal members 
who live outside of Indian Country is not.138 Despite the labyrinth of 
caveats and ambiguities, the states continue to stand to benefit from the 
exercise of taxing power over gaming operations. In particular “income 
earned by employees living off the reservation, money or prizes won by 
non-reservation residents, and goods and services provided by non-tribal 
vendors” remain subject to state taxation.139  
Nevertheless, “[a]lthough some states welcome the economic boost that 
Indian gaming provides, there has also been a considerable backlash to its 
development.”140 “States over-whelmingly [sic] attempt to mitigate this 
                                                                                                                 
express statement of congressional intent to preempt. A federal statute will be preemptive if 
the ‘state law conflicts with the purpose or operation of a federal statute’ . . . the IGRA 
creates a comprehensive jurisdictional framework for the regulation of gaming activities on 
Indian lands. The regulation of gaming by states outside the framework of the IGRA would 
frustrate this framework and Congress's careful balancing of the competing interests 
involved in Indian gaming.”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 134. Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 545 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(“Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power to the states by 
means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribal-state compact.”) 
 135. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State 
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible 
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are 
sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. 
Wilson, 37 F.3d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 
462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)). 
 136. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing Indian tax immunity). 
 137. See Kemper, supra note 101, §§ 17-18. 
 138. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); accord 
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Dark-Eyes v. 
Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 887 A.2d 848 (Conn. 2006). 
 139. Alan P. Meister et al., Indian Gaming and Beyond: Tribal Economic Development 
and Diversification, 54 S.D. L. REV. 375, 397 (2009). 
 140. Matthew Murphy, Betting the Rancheria: Environmental Protections as Bargaining 
Chips Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 173 
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backlash by demanding large revenue-sharing agreements in the tribal-state 
compacting process.”141 “Under such an arrangement, a tribe hands over to 
the state a fixed sum or a percentage of its gaming revenues. . . it is 
estimated that the Seminole Tribe, for example, produces over $1 billion in 
gaming revenues annually, $100 million of which it now shares with the 
State of Florida under those parties' January 2008 compact.”142  
Indian gaming has facilitated the improvement of economic 
conditions for many tribes,143 however, the legislative gaps in IGRA 
have rendered it, and consequently its beneficial impact, susceptible to 
butchery by the courts. In addition to permitting the imposition of state 
regulation and taxation under certain and somewhat ambiguous 
circumstances, IGRA’s abrogation of tribal sovereignty in contrast to the 
strength of state Eleventh Amendement immunity creates a grievous 
inbalance of bargaining power.  
This imbalance became notably evident after the Seminole decision 
rendered IGRA’s compulsory tribal-state compacting provision moot. As a 
practical matter, revenue-sharing agreements became the sole “mechanism 
by which tribes [could] induce states to conclude class III gaming 
compacts,”144 forcing many tribes to choose between forfeiting a portion of 
gaming revenue to the state or forgoing highly profitable gaming operations 
altogether.  
B. Indian Tobacco 
Traditionally, Native Americans managed to profit from the sale of 
tobacco products because, as dependent nations who enjoy sovereign 
immunity, “[s]tate sales taxes [were generally] not applicable on Indian 
reservations, and many smokers [went] to them in order to buy cigarettes 
                                                                                                                 
(2009) (citing Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 39, 69 (2007)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Courtney J. A. DaCosta, When "Turnabout" Is Not "Fair Play": Tribal Immunity 
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 543 (2009) (citing Notice of 
Deemed Approved Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact, 73 Fed. Reg. 1229, 1229 (Jan. 7, 
2008); John Holland, Gambling Compact Challenged: House Speaker Asks Court To Block 
Seminoles Deal, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 20, 2007, at 1A). 
143. For example “[o]ne recent study found that between 1990 and 2000, the presence of 
a tribal casino increased average per capita income by 7.4%.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
144. Courtney J. A. DaCosta, Note, When “Turnabout” Is Not “Fair Play”: Tribal 
Immunity Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 543 (2009). 
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and other products at a discount.”145 However, a sordid history of federal 
legislation and Supreme Court jurisprudence has chipped away at the scope 
of the tribal exemption from state tax.146 In addition, state legislation 
enacted in many states to “more stringently regulate the sale of tobacco 
products” has worked to decrease the profitability of Indian tobacco 
sales.147  
Although Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal sovereign 
immunity from state taxation of tobacco, it has demonstrated intent to 
forestall tribal circumvention of state tobacco taxes. Under the “Prevent All 
Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009” (PACT Act), all Indian tobacco 
businesses must comply with reporting requirements to state tax 
administrators, regulations of shipments of cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco, and state stamping (taxation) requirements.148 Noncompliant 
Indian vendors are subject to both civil and criminal penalties under the 
federal enforcement statute.149 
In addition, the tribal tobacco market is complicated by the passage of 
the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), a settlement agreement entered 
into between forty-six states (as well as the District of Columbia and five 
U.S. territories) and several major domestic tobacco companies resolving 
litigation over the health problems caused by tobacco.150 The MSA requires 
tobacco companies to pay approximately $10 billion per year to the settling 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Shihoko Goto, American Indians Fear Tobacco Tax Fixes May Hurt Them, 
CONGRESSDAILY, May 1, 2008, at 16. 
 146. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). 
 147. Patricia Molteni, Regulating Tribal Cigarette Sales Under the Master Settlement 
Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. GAZETTE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.naag. 
org/publications/naagazette/volume-6-number-1/regulating-tribal-cigarette-sales-under-the-
master-settlement-agreement.php. 
 148. Kathryn A. Mayer, Negotiating Past The Zero-Sum Of Intractable Sovereignty 
Positions by Exploring the Potential of Possible Party Interests: A Proposed Dispute 
Resolution Framework for the Tobacco Tax Debacle Between the State Of New York & the 
Seneca Nation of Indians, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 771, 803 (2013). 
 149. Id.  
 150. See Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CENTER, http://publichealth 
lawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-settlement-agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 
1, 2014). The four tobacco companies, frequently referred to as Participating Manufacturers 
(“PMs”) or Original Participating Manufacturers (“OPMs”) in the context of the MSA and 
related state legislation, and “the majors” in the context of case law, include Philip Morris, 
Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. and Lorillard 
Tobacco Company. Molteni, supra note 147. 
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states151 and substantially restricts future tobacco marketing, but it also 
ensures the tobacco market is foreclosed to competitors who did not enter 
the MSA.152 In effect, the MSA ultimately requires all tobacco 
manufacturers “selling cigarettes to consumers within the [settling] state, 
whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or 
intermediaries,” to pay a specified dollar amount per unit sold for the 
benefit of that state.153  
In addition, most of the settling states have enacted additional 
complementary legislation or regulation in order to prevent tobacco 
companies who have not agreed to follow the MSA from selling their 
products within the state.154 Oklahoma, for example, publishes and 
maintains the Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and 
Brand Families (Directory), which lists the tobacco product manufacturers 
that have been certified by the state as compliant with Oklahoma tobacco 
laws.155 In order to enforce the payment requirements, Oklahoma legislation 
prohibits the sale or possession of tobacco products made by entities not 
listed in the Directory.156 In order to “avoid having their products deemed 
‘contraband,’” which is subject to seizure by the state (and may entitle the 
settling state to any gross proceeds realized from the sale of contraband 
tobacco products), tribes can only sell tobacco products made by 
manufacturers listed in the state’s Directory.157 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 150. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 37 OKLA. STAT. § 600.23 (2011). 
 154. As the Second Circuit observed: 
After enactment of the Escrow Statutes, New York and the other states passed 
“Contraband Statutes,” or “Certification Statutes,” to help ensure compliance 
with the Escrow Statutes. These laws require cigarette manufacturers, other 
than OPMs [Original Participating Manufacturers], that sell products in a state 
to certify annually to the state attorney general that they are either (1) meeting 
their obligation as an SPM [Subsequent Participating Manufacturer] under the 
MSA or (2) making escrow deposits as an NPM. 
Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 155. Molteni, supra note 147. 
 156. Id.; see also 68 OKLA. STAT. § 360.4(C) (2011); id. § 360.8(G). 
 157. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2012). I this case the 
plaintiff, as a tribal tobacco retailer, was not directly regulated as a “tobacco product 
manufacturer” in Oklahoma, and the Tenth Circuit “rejected the tribe's argument that 
government seizure of unstamped cigarettes outside Indian territory affects the tribe as it 
restricts the brands of cigarettes tribal members can buy inside the territory.” 10th Circuit 
Rejects Oklahoma Tribe’s Challenge to Tobacco Laws, WESTLAW J. TOBACCO INDUSTRY, 
Mar. 23, 2012, 27 No. 14 WJTOB 7 (Westlaw). 
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Although the contours of Indian sovereign immunity from state taxation 
are not perfectly clear, the argument that tribal sovereign immunity 
insulates Indian tobacco from state regulation has been all but foreclosed, if 
only because its protection is limited to circumstances that, for most tribes, 
are not economically feasible. “The modern-day jurisdictional framework 
housing the dispute over state taxation of [tribal] tobacco sales to non-
Indians on reservation land reflects both a controversy over competing 
claims of Indian sovereignty, and state complaints of unfair competition 
that are entrenched in both politics and economics.”158 As a result, the 
judicial dissemination of tribal sovereign immunity protection from state 
taxation and regulation has been more or less consistent while still 
maintaining enough fact-specific ambiguity to keep state and tribal interests 
wrestling in court.159  
The Supreme Court maintains a “unique Indian tax immunity 
jurisprudence,”160 which rests on two pertinent principles: first, “[a]bsent 
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation 
boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law 
otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State”;161 and second, a state may 
“impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of Indian 
retailers doing business on the reservation,”162 unless the tribe actually 
bears the incidence of the tax.163 Slowly chipping away at the traditional 
understanding of tribal immunity from state taxation, the Supreme Court 
has held that states may collect taxes on: sales to non-Indians on Indian 
Land;164 companies owned by non-Indians on Indian Land;165 property 
owned by non-Indians on Indian Land;166 and allotment lands.167  
                                                                                                                 
 158. Mayer, supra note 148, at 803. 
 159. See generally Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 
61, 73 (1994) (“Resolution of conflicts of this kind does not depend on ‘rigid rule[s]’ or on 
‘mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty,’ but instead on ‘a 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an 
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority 
would violate federal law.”) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136, 142, 145 (1980)); see also Mayer, supra note 148, at 803-05. 
 160. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 112 (2005). 
 161. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973). 
 162. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
151 (1980). 
 163. Id.; see also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Wagnon v. 
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005). 
 164. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (referencing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of 
Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991)).  
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An illustrative example of jurisprudence regarding the relationship of 
tribes and taxes lies in the recent King Mountain Tobacco litigation. King 
Mountain Tobacco Company is owned and operated by an enrolled member 
of the Yakima reservation, and located on trust lands within the Yakima 
reservation.168 The Yakima Nation contended that their tobacco products 
were exempt from both a Washington state escrow statute169 and federal 
excise taxes.170 During processing, King Mountain ships its tobacco to 
Tennessee, and then to North Carolina where it is blended with tobacco 
grown off-reservation. The tobacco is sent back to the reservation for final 
processing before it is distributed for sale throughout Washington and in 
about sixteen other states.171  
In King Mountain Tobacco Co. v. McKenna,172 the district court found 
that King Mountain's “operations involve[d] extensive off-reservation 
activity,” and that “the tobacco products produced by King Mountain 
[were] not principally generated from the use of reservation land and 
resources.”173 In light of these factual findings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s ruling that Washington’s non-discriminatory state escrow 
statute was fully enforceable against the company just as a state sales tax on 
the tobacco would have been.174 On the other hand, in King Mountain 
Tobacco Co. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau (2013), the district 
court found that the trust-land grown tobacco was not itself subject to a 
federal excise tax.175 In fact, if the tobacco had simply been grown on 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. (referencing Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 
(1999)). 
 166. Id. (referencing Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898)). 
 167. Id. (referencing Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 
(1998); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 
(1992)). Allotment lands are reservation land that Congress has authorized individuals to 
hold in fee when made subject to sale under the General Allotment Act of 1887. Id. 
 168. King Mt. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 1061, 1062 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (finding the lands held in trust under IRA). 
 169. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 170. King Mt. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 923 F. 
Supp. 2d 1280 (E.D. Wash. 2013); King Mt. Tobacco Co., 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
 171. McKenna, 768 F.3d at 994 (quoting King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, 
No. CV-11-3018-LRS, 2013 WL 1403342 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2013)). 
 172. 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 173. Id. at 992 (internal citations omitted).  
 174. Id. at 996-97. 
 175. 923 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283 (E.D. Wash. 2013). 
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reservation lands and then sold, “those sales, and the income derived 
therefrom, would be tax free.”176  
The possibility of future litigation in favor of meaningful tribal immunity 
from state tax seems unlikely. Moreover, under the current framework, 
sovereign immunity from state tax would be applicable only where: (1) 
federal law expressly exempts a tribe from state taxation;177 (2) the state has 
exempted a particular tribe from state tax by statute, regulation, or 
contract;178 or (3) a company is wholly owned by a single federally 
recognized tribe,179 produces, manufactures and conducts sales180 (only to 
members of the same tribe)181 exclusively on property that is owned wholly 
by the tribe and located on reservation land.182 As a result, many states have 
taken advantage of the tribe’s disadvantaged position, commonly 
renegotiating tobacco compacts and raising tax rates,183 effectively 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Id. at 1284.  
 177. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973); Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 113 (2005) (quoting Mescalero). 
 178. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (West 2010) (providing that the terms 
of a contract between the state and tribe take precedence over any conflicting statutory 
provisions regarding restricted tribal exemption from state tax on the “sale, use, 
consumption, handling, possession or distribution of all cigarettes”). 
 179. See Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d 199, 210 
(holding that sovereign immunity does not automatically extend to “every business that 
happens to be tribally chartered or owned by individuals of Native-American ancestry,” but 
rather the entity must “act[] as an arm of the tribe so that its activities are properly deemed to 
be those of the tribe”); see also King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, No. CV-11-
3018-LRS, 2013 WL 1403342 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2013), aff’d, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 180. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 181. See Edmondson, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d at 215 (“When [tribal cigarette commerce] 
occurs off the reservation or among more than one tribe, this conduct is generally subject to 
all non-discriminatory state laws so long as they are not expressly prohibited by federal 
law.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (exempting from state taxes cigarette sales 
from federally recognized tribal organizations to members of their own tribe under the 
jurisdiction of their own tribe for their own use). 
 182. See, e.g., Edmondson, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d at 215. The General Allotment Act 
and later amendments worked to exempt the following tribes from the imposition of state 
civil jurisdiction, including imposition of state taxes: Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, 
Chickasaw, Seminole Osage, Sac and Fox, in the Oklahoma Territory, any of the 
reservations of the Seneca Nation of New York, and a strip of territory in the State of 
Nebraska adjoining the Sioux Nation. See 25 U.S.C. § 340 (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 339 (2012). 
 183. In Oklahoma, for example: 
Oklahoma officials are pushing to raise taxes on tribal tobacco sales to a level 
that would reduce or wipe out the competitive price advantage tribal smoke 
shops have enjoyed for decades. . . Gov. Mary Fallin’s general council . . . said 
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foreclosing the possibility of a tribal economic advantage over non-tribal 
tobacco retailers in the state. 
C. Hemp Production: Pine Ridge and the White Plume Controversy 
More recently, tribes have considered hemp production as an alternative 
to the tobacco market. Unlike tobacco, which “wears out the land, 
exhausting minerals and nutrients from the soil,”184 hemp actually improves 
the soil in which it is grown.185 In addition, industrial hemp cultivation 
requires virtually no pesticides and minimal fertilizer to grow successfully 
in many different soils and climates and provides abundant alternative 
sources for the production of paper, clothing and fossil fuels.186  
The Pine Ridge Reservation, home of the Oglala Sioux in South Dakota, 
encompasses the entirety of Shannon County,187 “the poorest county in 
America.”188 As of 2002, “[f]orty percent of reservation housing [was] 
listed as substandard, and one-fifth of the homes [did] not have indoor 
plumbing or telephone services.”189 Only 84,000 acres of the 2.1 million 
acres of reservation land are suitable for agriculture.190 
The CSA makes it illegal to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess 
hemp191 without a “DEA Certificate of Registration” (DEA registration).192 
                                                                                                                 
the main goal of negotiations with tribes over new tobacco compacts is not to 
improve health outcomes, but to make tobacco taxes more consistent in the 
state. 
Clifton Adcock, Oklahoma Pushes to Boost Taxes on Tribal Tobacco Sales, NEWSOK (July 
5, 2013), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-pushes-to-boost-taxes-on-tribal-tobacco-sales/article/ 
3859155.  
 184. Charles A. Grymes, Tobacco in Virginia, VIRGINIA PLACES, http://www.virginia 
places.org/agriculture/tobacco.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 185. See Lash, supra note 43, at 335-37. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Pine Ridge Indian Reservation – Civic Life and History, BLACK HILLS KNOWLEDGE 
NETWORK, http://blackhillsknowledgenetwork.org/pine-ridge/pine-ridge-civic-life-and-history 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 188. Lash, supra note 43, at 334 (citing Pine Ridge Reservation, HECEL OYAKAPI, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20010218003320/http://lakotastory.org/pineridge.html (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2015)). 
 189. Id.  
 190. See Pine Ridge Indian Reservation – Civic Life and History, supra note 187. 
 191. The Act defines marijuana as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether 
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or 
resin.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012). 
 192. United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2006).  
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The CSA’s registration requirements193 and penalties194 apply to “any 
person,” including tribal members.195 Even so, in 1998, the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe passed an ordinance to amend the Tribal Penal Code to specifically 
exclude industrial hemp from the definition of marijuana.  
In 2000, Alex White Plume, a member of the Lakota nation196 who 
believed that the tribe retained the right to cultivate hemp under the Treaty 
of Fort Laramie (Treaty),197 ceremonially planted his first crop of industrial 
hemp on 1.5 acres198 of federal trust land199 with wild seeds found on Pine 
Ridge on the 132nd anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.200 Although 
Alex White Plume announced the planting of his crop on the local 
reservation radio and invited representatives from the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and State Attorney’s office to attend the ceremony,201 he did 
not apply for a DEA registration.202 After Alex White Plume contracted to 
sell the crop, the U.S. government “obtained samples of it under a search 
warrant, and, pursuant to court order, destroyed it.”203 
In 2001, Percy White Plume likewise planted a crop of hemp on federal 
trust land without a DEA registration, and again the government destroyed 
the crop.204 In 2002, Alex White Plume planted another crop of industrial 
hemp, prompting “the government [to] ask[] the district court to declare 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(1) (“Every person who manufactures or distributes any 
controlled substance or list I chemical, or who proposes to engage in the manufacture or 
distribution of any controlled substance or list I chemical, shall obtain annually a registration 
issued by the Attorney General in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by 
him.”). 
 194. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”). 
 195. See United States v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., 822 F. Supp. 2d 326, 337 
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States. v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2001)); Lash, 
supra note 43, at 344. 
 196. See Lash, supra note 43, at 337 (quoting Alex White Plume, Lakota). 
 197. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1074. 
 198. Lash, supra note 43, at 340. 
 199. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069. 
 200. Lash, supra note 43, at 340.  
 201. See id. at 340-41 (explaining that White Plume was celebrating the 132nd 
anniversary of the signing of the Fort Laramie Treaty which he believed granted the tribe the 
right to cultivate hemp). 
 202. White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069. 
 203. Id. But see Lash, supra note 43, at 341 (asserting that the lab test revealed that the 
plants contained no detectable quantity of THC). 
 204. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069-70. 
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them [the White Plumes] in violation of the [CSA] and permanently enjoin 
them from manufacturing or distributing cannabis.”205 After finding that the 
White Plumes violated the CSA by growing hemp, a type of marijuana, and 
that no treaty right to grow hemp existed, the district court granted the 
government summary judgment and ordered the White Plumes 
“permanently enjoined from cultivating Cannabis sativa L. without a valid 
DEA registration.”206 In United States v. White Plume,207 the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, stating:  
We are not unmindful of the challenges faced by members of the 
Tribe to engage in sustainable farming on federal trust lands. It 
may be that the growing of hemp for industrial uses is the most 
viable agricultural commodity for that region. And we do not 
doubt that there are a countless number of beneficial products 
which utilize hemp in some fashion. Nor do we ignore the 
burdens imposed by a DEA registration necessary to grow hemp 
legally, such as the security measures required by the 
regulations . . . . But these are policy arguments better suited for 
the congressional hearing room than the courtroom. Today we 
fulfill our role to interpret and apply the statute as written by 
Congress, and affirm the district court.208 
Although Indian gaming, Indian tobacco and tribal hemp production do not 
provide a complete framework that is perfectly analogous to Indian 
marijuana, the legal issues raised by tribal involvement in these commercial 
activitites provide a useful context for a potential tribal marijuana market.  
III. Proposed Federal Legislation: A Pro-Marijuana Policy Statement? 
In addition to the marijuana policy implicit in the Consolidated Further 
and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015,209 several pieces of proposed 
legislation suggest that Congress has finally heard the cry of public opinion 
in favor of legalizing marijuana.210  
                                                                                                                 
 205. Id. at 1070.  
 206. Id. 
 207. 447 F.3d 1067. 
 208. Id. at 1076.  
 209. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 210. “[F]or the first time, a clear majority of Americans (58%) say the drug should be 
legalized. This is in sharp contrast to the time Gallup first asked the question in 1969, when 
only 12% favored legalization.” Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing 
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On February 5, 2013, the “Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 
2013” was proposed in the House of Representatives.211 The bill seeks to 
“decriminalize marijuana at the Federal level, to leave to the States a power 
to regulate marijuana that is similar to the power they have to regulate 
alcohol.”212 The bill specifies that the term “state” includes territories and 
possessions of the United States.213 Under the Act, which was referred to 
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, And 
Investigations in February of 2013, “[i]t shall be unlawful, except pursuant 
to a [federal] permit . . . to engage in the business of cultivating, producing, 
manufacturing, packaging, or warehousing marijuana.”214 The bill further 
makes it unlawful to transport marijuana from a state where it is legal to 
another state which still prohibits marijuana.215 However penalties for the 
import of marijuana into a state where marijuana remains illegal are 
expressly provided within the proposed federal law, and include a fine 
and/or imprisonment for less than one year.216 In addition, import, 
production, manufacture and sale of marijuana is unlawful “except pursuant 
to a permit issued . . . by the Secretary of the Treasury.”217  
On the very same day, the “Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013” hit the 
House floor, setting forth to “amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 
provide for the taxation of marijuana.”218 The proposed act imposes a tax on 
producers and importers of marijuana of 50% of the sales price of 
marijuana.219 Pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary, no tax 
shall be imposed on the sale by the producer or importer unless the 
purchaser is a retailer, distributor, or consumer.220 In other words, a 
                                                                                                                 
Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-
americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.  
 211. H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499/text (last visited Aug. 24, 
2015). 
 212. Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. sec. 201, § 303. 
 214. Id. sec. 201, § 301. 
 215. Id. sec. 201, § 302. 
 216. Id. sec. 102, § 103. 
 217. Id. sec. 201, § 301. 
 218. H.R. 501 – Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/501/text (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).  
 219. Id. sec. 2, § 5901.  
 220. See id. sec. 2, § 5902. In pertinent part section 5902(a) reads: 
 (a) General Rule. Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, no tax shall 
be imposed under this subchapter on the sale by the producer or importer of an 
article- 
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producer is not liable for the 50% excise tax if the purchaser intends to 
export, produce, or resale the product for the purposes of export or 
production. The proposed tax act does not define “exporter,” but this term 
likely includes those who ship marijuana to a possession of the United 
States.221 An “importer” is a person in the United States who receives non-
tax-paid marijuana or marijuana products shipped from a foreign country or 
U.S. territory.222  
Still further, the Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2013 was introduced in 
the House on February 6, 2013, seeking to amend section 102 of the CSA 
by excluding hemp from the definition of marijuana.223 This provision 
legalizes the production, possession and sale of a particular species of 
cannabis that is not psychoactive.224 Because of environmental and 
economic benefits, many states, including South Dakota, are considering 
legalizing hemp.225 
IV. Legal Analysis: Tribal Involvement in the Marijuana Industry Under the 
CSA and Proposed Legislation 
The status quo, namely a federal prohibition of marijuana in 
juxtaposition to an administration permitting states and tribes to legalize 
marijuana, offsets the stage for conflict between states and tribes regardless 
of whether they are for or against marijuana legalization. For example, both 
states and Indian nations that are opposed to marijuana legalization will 
find that their ability to prohibit marijuana from entering their community is 
ultimately hindered by the double-edged doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Concerning Native Americans, in the absence of federal decriminalization 
and regulation that permits a concerted national enforcement strategy, tribes 
that are harmed by the diversion of marijuana products onto their lands will 
                                                                                                                 
 (1) for use by the purchaser for further production, or for resale by the 
purchaser to a second purchaser for use by such second purchaser in further 
production, or 
 (2) for export, or for resale by the purchaser to a second purchaser for 
export. 
Id. However, § 5902(f) provides: “For purposes of this chapter, a producer to whom 
an article is sold or resold free of tax under subsection (a)(1) for use by him in further 
production shall be treated as the producer of such article.” Id. 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. sec. 2, § 5904. 
 223. S. 359 – Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www. 
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/359/text (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 224. See id. 
 225. Hopkins, supra note 52. 
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continue to suffer without a means of redress because the states retain 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.226 Concerning the states, the 
DOJ’s announcement that the federal government will not prosecute Native 
Americans growing and selling marijuana on tribal lands has been 
commonly understood to mean that it “will not prosecute Native Americans 
who grow and sell marijuana on tribal lands, even in states where the drug 
is illegal.”227 Because a state’s interest in preventing marijuana production 
on tribal lands will likely be insufficient to overcome tribal immunity from 
state regulation,228 if Congress has any interest in preventing tribes from 
engaging in the marijuana industry in states where marijuana remains 
prohibited, it must expressly abrogate such tribal immunity. 
Despite the potential conflicts between communities that stand on 
opposing sides of the marijuana-legalization debate, it is evident that many 
states have considered the potential cost of litigation to be minimal when 
compared to the potential of marijuana related revenue.229 “Like the gaming 
industry, the cannabis industry has the potential to provide Native 
Americans with more jobs, capital, and sovereignty.”230 So why have tribes 
not followed the example of the states, ignore the CSA, decriminalize and 
tax marijuana, and perhaps even grow marijuana? The answer is simple. 
The ambiguity and confusion in American Indian law coupled with the 
unpredictability and uncertainty of marijuana law231 creates a singular 
inevitability: a real and substantial risk.  
For example, while those private businesses in the marijuana industry 
risk finding themselves unable to enforce marijuana related business 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida). 
Unlike Oklahoma and Nebraska, tribes affected by diversion cannot sustain an action against 
a state that asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity. Compare Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 
U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982) (disregarding claim of state immunity from suit because the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state by another state that has a substantial 
interest in the outcome of the suit), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state by Native 
American Tribes). See also supra Part I.E. for a discussion of the recent marijuana diversion 
suit brought by Oklahoma and Nebraska against Colorado.   
 227. Amanda Lewis, Why Did the Feds Just Legalize Cannabis on Native American 
Lands?, LA WEEKLY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/music/why-did-the-feds-
just-legalize-cannabis-on-native-american-lands-5290569.  
 228. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 229. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 230. Native American Tribes Consider Legalizing Marijuana, VIRDIS LAW GROUP (July 
17, 2014), http://viridislawgroup.com/native-american-tribes-consider-legalizing-marijuana/. 
 231. See discussion supra Part I.E.  
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agreements,232 if a tribe were a party to a marijuana related tribal-state 
compact lacking waivers of sovereign immunity, both tribal and state 
sovereign immunity would stand as an additional hurdle to contract 
enforcement and serve as yet another deterrent to tribal-state compacting 
and government-to-government cooperation.233  
Nevertheless, Congress’ first attempts to decriminalize and tax marijuana 
do little to solve the problem of legal confusion for Native Americans. The 
proposed federal legislation seeks to amend both the CSA and the IRS 
code, both of which are statutes of general applicability that apply to Native 
Americans.234 Under the current proposed legislation, the lack of any 
Congressional reference to the acts’ intended application in Indian Country, 
specifically the intended civil regulatory and criminal prohibitory 
relationship between the tribes and the states, creates a new problem for the 
courts to attempt to solve. 
A. Is the Preemptive Effect of the CSA Enough to Protect the White Plumes 
and Others if the CSA Is Amended to Exclude Industrial Hemp from the 
Definition of Marijuana? 
As a general matter, the questions of choice of law and criminal 
jurisdiction elicit imprecise answers in the context of Indian law because 
American Indian law is the confluence of and interaction between the 
policy, statutory law, and common law of three different overlapping 
sovereigns: the federal government, the states, and the tribes. Because the 
Supreme Court has yet to specifically weigh in whether or not the CSA 
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause,235 additional uncertainties 
have arisen now that new questions concerning the legality of marijuana on 
reservation land that is located in a state that is implementing its own 
marijuana policy that is itself located within a country where marijuana is 
illegal pursuant to a federal statute that remains unenforced due to federal 
policy considerations. Although the Supremacy Clause question has been 
raised in pending litigation,236 Congress may enact proposed marijuana 
legislation before an opinion is rendered. Proposed legislation to remove 
industrial hemp from the definition of marijuana under the CSA is likely to 
                                                                                                                 
 232. Id. 
 233. See discussion supra Parts I.A, E. 
 234. See supra note 43. 
 235. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 236. See discussion supra Part I.E. (discussing Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 
144 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2014)). 
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be the first step towards federal decriminalization because it comprises the 
least ambitious piece of pro-marijuana legislation on the floor.  
Although in theory this amendment to the CSA will finally give power to 
the Oglala Sioux tribal ordinance that likewise excludes industrial hemp 
from the definition of marijuana,237 the possession, and therefore the 
production and sale, of “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”238 
remains criminally proscribed under the laws of South Dakota.239 Even 
though the possession of hemp fiber, oil, or cake made from hemp seeds is 
not prohibited under the laws of South Dakota,240 and South Dakota does 
not exercise criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands because it is not a PL 280 
state,241 any unaltered hemp transported to or from the Pine Ridge 
reservation will remain subject state criminal sanctions and confiscation 
unless South Dakota amends its criminal code242 or the U.S. Supreme Court 
holds that the CSA preempts state law.243 
B. Are Domestic Dependent Nations “Territories or Possessions of the 
United States”? 
Proposed legislation to tax marijuana applies to producers or importers 
engaged in retail or distribution, but provides an importer or producer tax 
exemption from the 50% federal excise tax.244 If federally recognized tribes, 
as sovereign nations are deemed to fall outside of the definition of “territory 
or possession of the United States,” they may be able to use the exporter 
status to gain an economic advantage over businesses within the states.  
However, while “Congress has unambiguously intended for the word 
‘person,’ as used in the Internal Revenue Code, to encompass all legal 
entities, including Indian tribes and tribal organizations, that are the subject 
of rights and duties,”245 there is no clear case law determining whether 
tribes are considered a possession or territory of the United States.246 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Ordinance No. 98-27 (July 28, 1998), available at 
https://www.votehemp.com/PDF/OrdinanceNo9827.pdf. 
 238. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-1 (2015). 
 239. See, e.g., id. § 22-42-6 (“No person may knowingly possess marijuana.”). 
 240. Id. § 22-42-1.  
 241. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012). 
 242. South Dakota has considered legalizing industrial hemp. See Hopkins, supra note 
52. 
 243. See discussion supra Parts I.A, E. 
 244. See discussion supra Part III. 
 245. 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 36 (2010). 
 246. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because Indian 
nations are not referenced in the statute, the question is whether tribes are ‘territories or 
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Despite the fact that nearly all federal environmental laws expressly treat 
tribes as states,247 the current bills leave much unresolved for Native 
Americans. Specifically, whether or not the tribes will be treated as states 
and permitted to independently regulate marijuana in Indian Country, and 
whether or not the tribes can take advantage of the importer-producer 
excise tax exemption, remains unclear. 
C. What Is “A Power to Regulate Marijuana That Is Similar to the Power 
States Have to Regulate Alcohol”? 
The bill to end federal prohibition of marijuana, leaving to the states the 
power to regulate marijuana like they currently regulate alcohol,248 prohibits 
the import of marijuana into a state where marijuana remains illegal, 
penalizes such violations under federal law,249 and provides that the 
Secretary of the Treasury will not permit a marijuana business in a state 
where such business is unlawful.250 As domestic dependent nations, federal 
law is clear that tribal lands are subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
                                                                                                                 
possessions’ of the United States under the statute. . . . [I]n United States ex rel. Mackey v. 
Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103-04, 15 L.Ed. 299 (1855), the Court held the Cherokee 
nation was a territory as that term was used in a federal letters of administration statute. By 
contrast, in New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 474-75, 29 S.Ct. 190, 191-92, 
53 L.Ed. 286 (1909), the Court cited with approval Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305 
(W.D.Ark.1883) in which the district court held that the Cherokee nation was not a 
‘territory’ under the federal extradition statute. State courts have reached varied results, 
citing either Mackey or Morgan as authority, depending on the outcome.” (citations 
omitted)); Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Anne W. Bishop, The Three-Billion-Dollar 
Question, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 323, 344 (2009); see also United States v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 
173 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is well settled that American Indian reservations have been 
‘incorporat[ed] within the territory of the United States,’ United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978), and thus are not foreign territory, see 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 165, 
100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(‘While they are sovereign for some purposes, it is now clear that Indian reservations do not 
partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign countries.’)); United States v. 
Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 847 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050, 119 S.Ct. 1355, 143 
L.Ed.2d 517 (1999); (‘[T]ribal governments are dependent sovereigns-not independent 
foreign ones.’); White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D.S.D.1977) (‘The Indian tribes 
have vestiges of sovereignty which must be guarded carefully, but reservations are not 
analogous to foreign states.’), aff'd, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.1978).”). 
 247. Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded 
Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 924-35 (1999). 
 248. See discussion supra Part III. 
 249. See discussion supra Part III.  
 250. See H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, supra note 211. 
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States.251 But without clear case law on whether or not domestic dependent 
nations are territories or possessions of the United States, one must ask: 
under this Act will tribes, states, and/or the federal government retain 
jurisdiction over criminal marijuana offenses on Indian land? Further, will 
this legislation preempt the enforcement of state criminal law in the same 
manner as IGRA?252  
 “[I]n theory, if the federal government truly respected the rights and will 
of our nation’s original inhabitants, it would respect tribal nations’ choice to 
legalize [or prohibit] marijuana.”253 Without an express statement that tribes 
are to be treated as states under proposed legislation, the prospect of 
authoritative tribal marijuana law remains tenuous at best. At present, the 
federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate liquor on 
Indian lands.254 States regulate liquor sales on tribal land under a federal 
statute that permits liquor sales in Indian Country but only “in conformity 
both with the laws of the State . . . and with an ordinance duly adopted by 
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country.”255 Moreover, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tribes have no inherent power to 
regulate liquor because of their status as domestic dependent nations.256 
  
                                                                                                                 
 251. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 252. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 253. Native American Tribes Consider Legalizing Marijuana, VIRIDIS LAW GROUP (July 
17, 2014), http://viridislawgroup.com/native-american-tribes-consider-legalizing-marijuana/. 
 254. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Mazurie: 
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power “(t)o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.” This Court has repeatedly held that this clause affords Congress 
the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages to tribal 
Indians, wherever situated, and to prohibit or regulate the introduction of 
alcoholic beverages into Indian country. 
419 U.S. 544, 555 (1975) (citing United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 417-18 
(1866); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1876); Ex 
parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1912); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 482 
(1914); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1914); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 
591, 597 (1916)). 
 255. See 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012). 
 256. Thomas H. Oehmke with Joan M. Brovins, Business Activities on Reservation—
Tribal Taxation—Liquor Control, in 2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 
40:112 (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983)). 
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D. Economic Feasibility Hinges on Tax Exemption: What Is the Best Way 
to Balance State, Federal and Tribal Interests? 
In light of the illustrative model of Indian tobacco, under the currently 
proposed statutory framework of federally legalized and taxed marijuana, 
the only feasible means for the tribes to profit from the marijuana industry 
would be through the avoidance of state and/or federal taxes.257 Without 
express congressional intent to exempt tribes from the proposed, and 
crippling, 50% federal tax258 on top of state taxes,259 the realization of tribal 
self-sufficiency through marijuana revenues is achievable only in specific 
circumstances. First, under a revival of the vanishing doctrine of sovereign 
immunity from non-discriminatory state taxes, tribes may achieve self-
sufficiency.260 Second, if tribes and tribal organizations are not considered a 
“possession” of the United States, they can increase the demand for 
marijuana produced, manufactured, or resold for production on Indian lands 
with the bargaining power of the proposed importer tax exemption.261 
Third, if tribes produce marijuana on tribal land and sell it to a purchaser 
for the purpose of production or export by that purchaser, the transaction 
would be exempt from the proposed federal excise tax.262 Fourth, through 
the production of marijuana exclusively on trust lands,263 which are exempt 
from state and local taxes, as well as federal income taxes under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Capoeman, tribes could bypass federal and 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See text accompanying supra note 79 and discussion supra Part II.B. 
 258. See 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 36 (2010) (“Indians, like all other 
citizens, are subject to federal income tax, unless some provision of a statute or treaty 
expressly and specifically confers an exemption.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 72 (discussing Colorado’s marijuana excise tax). 
 260. See text accompanying supra note 79 and discussion supra Part II.B. 
 261. See discussion supra Part III. 
 262. See id. 
 263. Title 25 U.S.C. § 465 states: 
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through 
purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, 
water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, 
including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living 
or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Title to any lands or 
rights acquired pursuant to this Act or the Act of July 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 392), 
as amended (25 U.S.C. 608 et seq.) shall be taken in the name of the United 
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is 
acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local 
taxation. 
25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012). 
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state taxation.264 Lastly, tribes can bypass these taxes through express 
exemption from state tax in state statute or by entering a controlling tribal-
state compact.265 
Even in the case of marijuana grown on tax-exempt lands, concerns of 
marketability in those twenty-three states that currently regulate marijuana 
remain. The U.S. Supreme Court continues to expressly provide states 
seeking to litigate their grievances in court with alternative methods to 
circumvent the advantages of tribal immunity. For example, in Oklahoma 
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma,266 the 
Supreme Court found that although the state could not sue the tribe itself 
for recovery of monies or for specific performance of its obligation to 
collect state sales taxes from non-member tobacco purchasers on 
reservation land, the state was not completely without remedy because 
“[s]tates may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, 
either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation,267 or by assessing 
wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores.”268  
V. A New Model for Federal Marijuana and Indian Policy: A Federal 
Regulatory Framework for Tribal Marijuana Production, Manufacture, and 
Retail 
While the above-mentioned mechanisms for the avoidance of tax exist, 
their implementation comes with a very probable side dish of extensive and 
costly litigation. As domestic dependent nations, Congress has the 
responsibility to enact restrictions on the rights and responsibilities of 
federally recognized tribes, and the role of determining the scope of federal 
Indian policy cannot be left to the courts.  
When taken at face value, the flashing lights and packed parking lots of 
the ever expanding Indian casinos appear to be economically benefitting the 
tribes. However, “[n]early half of federally recognized Tribes in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 264. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (holding that income derived from 
products grown on or contained within trust land is not taxable). 
 265. See Lee, supra note 72. In light of the many ways a state may circumvent a tribe’s 
immunity from taxation, the difficulty of enforcing tribal-state compacts, and the lack of 
tribal bargaining power, it is likely that states will not contract to exempt the tribes from any 
marijuana related taxes applicable therein. 
 266. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).  
 267. Id. at 514 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 161–62 (1980)).  
 268. Id. (citing City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 898 F.2d 122 
(10th Cir. 1990)). 
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States do not operate gaming facilities at all,”269 and “[g]ambling revenue at 
tribal casinos slowed in 2012, growing at a slower pace than non-tribal 
casinos for the first time in nearly 20 years.”270 Of those tribes operating 
successful gaming operations, there remains the possibility that some tribal 
members may never receive any direct financial benefit whatsoever.271  
Notwithstanding such legislative oversights, as a whole the IGRA was a 
good idea and an effective means of promoting tribal economic 
development. However, the IGRA’s disappointing impact on poverty and 
unemployment among Native Americans272 is due in large part to the 
development of Supreme Court jurisprudence creating what is essentially a 
standoff of sovereign immunity,273 establishing an unjust application of the 
Ex Parte Young Doctrine,274 and fostering hostility between states and 
tribes by leaving states without a remedy when a tribe’s breach of a tribal-
state gaming compact occurs off Indian lands.275 This jurisprudence 
undermines the tribal-state compacting process and thus undermines 
Congress’ careful and thoughtful balance of state and tribal interests.276 
In a similar vein, profit from Indian tobacco sales has been significantly 
reduced as a result of the federal PACT Act,277 state legislation relating to 
the MSA,278 judicial foreclosure of tribal sovereign immunity from 
taxation279 judicial refusal to recognize federal preemption protecting the 
tribal tobacco market from state tax regulation.280 In addition, despite the 
undaunted efforts of the White Plumes on the Pine Ridge reservation, the 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (citing ALAN P. MEISTER, CASINO CITY’S INDIAN GAMING REGISTRY REPORT 28 
(2009-2010 ed.)). 
 270. Stuart Pfeifer, Indian Casino Gambling Revenue Growth Is Slowing, Report Says, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/26/business/la-fi-mo-
indian-casino-gambling-20140326. 
 271. IGRA regulations do not require tribes to make per capita payments to tribe 
members. See 25 C.F.R. § 290.8 (2015); see also discussion supra Part II.A (discussing 
tribal-state gaming revenue sharing). 
 272. See discussion supra Parts II-II.A. 
 273. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77-100 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 274. See id. at 76.  
 275. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2012). 
 276. See Murphy, supra note 142, at 172.  
 277. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See generally Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 
U.S. 61 (1994).  
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production of industrial hemp remains prohibited under what appears to be 
an unequivocal application of the CSA,281 making the possibility of 
government confiscation and destruction of crops far too likely to support 
hemp nor the taxes derived thereof as a sound investment decision. 
In light of these and other similar legal doctrines that tend to favor state 
and federal interests over their tribal counterparts, it is unsurprising that 
tribes are in desperate need of a stable tax base.282 Fortunately, it is in the 
federal government’s interest to promote tribal economic self-sufficiency 
and independence from federal expenditures.283  
Any decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level would certainly 
be beneficial to Native American marijuana interests because marijuana 
related contracts would be deemed enforceable, any uncertainties 
concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and mutually satisfactory regimes 
for the collection of marijuana excise and retail taxes as between tribes and 
states could be negotiated and memorialized in tribal-state compacts.284 
In order to successfully balance federal interests in fostering tribal 
independence with state interests in maintaining the revenue they currently 
enjoy under state-legalization of marijuana, and to avoid costly litigation 
that could give rise to a new body of convoluted Indian law, Congress must 
get creative and do something unprecedented—something more than simply 
amending the CSA or copy-and-pasting the IRS tobacco tax code, 
substituting “tobacco” for “marijuana.”285  
Because more than half of the states in the union are currently in 
violation of federal law,286 Congress is in the unique position to condition a 
state’s involvement in the marijuana industry on its agreement to tribal-state 
compacting and waivers of immunity. Tribes, many in possession of 
extensive land that may only viably produce cannabis,287 a historical 
connection to the land, and potentially more environmentally friendly 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 282. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 283. For example, Congress enacted IGRA after finding that “a principal goal of Federal 
Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal government.” Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 2, 102 Stat. 
2467, 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012)). 
 284. See discussion supra Parts I.E-D, II.A. 
 285. The language of the proposed legislation is remarkably similar to that of the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that impose an excise tax on the sale of tobacco. 
Compare H.R. 501 – Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013, discussion supra Part III, sec. 2, §§ 
5901-5908, with 26 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5708 (2012).  
 286. See discussion supra Part I.A-B. 
 287. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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manners of production,288 have a unique ability and opportunity to facilitate 
widespread, successful, and green marijuana production.  
The most desirable outcome, and a clear and simple way to mitigate the 
effects of jurisprudence that deters tribal-state compacting, is for Congress 
to create a new regulatory framework for the tribal marijuana market 
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. “[T]he Indian Commerce 
Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of authority to the 
Federal Government at the expense of the States. . . the Indian Commerce 
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the 
Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause.”289 As a 
result, keeping all of the future federal marijuana tax revenue and lessons 
from Indian tobacco and gaming in mind, the federal regulatory scheme 
should seek to accomplish eight goals. First, under a comprehensive 
Marijuana act, Congress should establish a commission within the 
Department of Treasury that is authorized to issue permits to marijuana 
businesses in a particular state. The current proposed federal legislation 
prohibits any person from growing, manufacturing or selling marijuana 
without a permit issued by the Secretary of Treasury, 290 however an ideal 
act would condition the issuance of such permits after a cooperative, but 
independently established commission within the BIA coordinates with 
local, state, and tribal governments and certifies that the particular state 
either has made a good faith effort to enter into a tribal-state compact with 
any federally recognized tribes located within the state, or that no such 
tribes exist in the state.291 This scheme of collaboration between the BIA 
and other federal agencies has been well established and is similar to IGRA 
under which the NIGC works with the Office of Indian Gaming to facilitate 
Indian gaming while ensuring the blanced protection of state and local 
interests.292 Furthermore, concerning the potential backlash of applicant-
states opposed to the good-faith negotiation requirement, at least in those 
twenty-three states currently licensing and gaining tax revenue from the 
marijuana industry in violation of federal controlled substance and money 
                                                                                                                 
 288. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 289. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996). 
290. H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499/text (last visited Aug. 24, 
2015). 
 291. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the tribal-state compacting requirement of 
IGRA). 
292. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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laundering laws,293 such protestations ought to carry little weight and in 
theory should be estopped all together. 
Second, this new BIA commission must be granted the authority to 
certify whether an applicant-state has in fact made a good-faith effort to 
negotiate tribal-state marijuana compacts with any federally recognized 
tribe within its borders, authority to promulgate marijuana related 
regulations that are in the best interest of tribal self-sufficiency and 
economic independence, and authority to permit applicant-tribes to 
produce, manufacture and sell marijuana on Indian lands upon the tribe’s 
demonstrated ability to enforce the eight priorities in the Cole 
Memorandum.294  
Third, the federal government needs to address several interrelated 
issues. These include taking land into trust solely for purposes of marijuana 
production. Permitting the BIA to take land into trust only for purposes of 
production rather than retail or manufacture will work to cool any backlash 
from the states and other private interests, and is easily justified by cultural 
considerations buttressed by the fact that tribes are often rich in land that 
may be suitable only for the growth of cannabis.295 The federal government 
also needs to address issuing business grants for the development of 
compliant regulatory schemes and tribal marijuana business enterprises 
capable of considerable competition in the national market. In consideration 
of the poverty that remains among tribes and the growing concerns about 
diversion, it is essential that the federal government recognize Indian 
marijuana enterprises as legitimate businesses, and accordingly issue 
substantial business grants to ensure that tribes have the tools necessary to 
create and enforce tribal marijuana regulation to prevent diversion, while 
developing product that is capable of meaningfully competing in the 
market.296  
Fourth, any federal act needs to provide a mandatory model tribal-state 
compact297 that expressly waives any claims of sovereign immunity from 
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compulsory dispute resolution within the Commission’s federal 
administrative forum;298 permits tribal-state revenue sharing only within 
modest parameters which benefit tribes and are established by the Secretary 
of the Interior and approved by the Commission;299 allows the imposition of 
state regulation, including taxation, only with the consent of the tribe 
manifest by the passage of a tribal ordinance;300 and subjects both tribal and 
state officials to Ex Parte Young actions, but does not abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of either sovereign from any private cause of action 
outside of the designated administrative forum.301  
Fifth, any federal legislation needs to expressly exempt compacting 
tribes from any federal excise or income tax for a period of fifty years.302 
Exemption from federal income and excise taxes, especially if the tax 
remains at the proposed 50% of the sales price, will substantially improve 
tribes’ ability to enter and remain in the marijuana market. The fifty year 
limitation provides a meaningful reprise from federal tax permitting the 
Indian marijuana industry to grow, while ensuring that the exemption will 
not stand to be a permanent source of natural market frustration or tribal 
dependence, again justifying the promotion of tribal self-sufficiency while 
balancing state interests.  
Sixth, any act should work to improve the economics of tribal 
populations by expressly requiring compacting tribes to allocate income 
first to per capita payments, second to the maintenance of the requisite 
robust regulatory scheme, and finally to the infrastructure of the tribal 
government. The requirement of revenue allocation first to per capita 
payments is likely to be more directly impactful on the members of the 
tribe, and consequently do more to foster tribal financial independence, than 
the reverse revenue allocation provisions of the IGRA.303  
Seventh, any federal legislation should expressly preempt all state 
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute any and all violations of state marijuana 
law by any member of a federally recognized tribe in those states certified 
to receive federal permits, whether the violation occurred on Indian Lands 
or otherwise. Rather than rehashing the question of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country that arises nearly every time Congress enacts legislation 
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, an express assumption of 
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exclusive federal jurisdiction over all violations of marijuana law 
committed by members of federally recognized tribes will hopefully reduce 
the incidence of litigation.304  
Lastly, federal legislation should expressly provide that the possession, 
sale, manufacture, production of marijuana within, or the diversion of 
marijuana into, any state or domestic dependent nation where such conduct 
or substance is unlawful shall be unlawful, and penalized solely and 
explicitly under federal law. This last proposal is of utmost importance in 
an ideal model. Specifically, because (in theory) state laws decriminalizing 
marijuana are preempted by the CSA,305 because it will be a provision of an 
Act enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause which authorizes the 
stripping of more state power than does the Interstate Commerce Clause,306 
because it leaves to the states and tribes the power to choose to legalize and 
regulate or criminalize marijuana,307 and because it establishes a concerted 
national enforcement strategy that can utilize the already existing and 
robust federal drug enforcement infrastructure and employees, he 
assumption of exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over violations of state 
and tribal marijuana laws after lifting the federal marijuana prohibition is 
not completely without merit and further forecloses litigation over any 
questions concerning the preemptive scope and force of the model Act.308 
Conclusion 
Currently, immense uncertainty exists in both Indian law and marijuana 
law. For Native Americans, under proposed federal legislation to 
decriminalize and tax marijuana, confusion will remain as to whether the 
federal government has preempted state regulation, including state taxation 
and the enforcement of state criminal laws. Permitting the tribes to take part 
in the marijuana industry is necessary to achieve the connected goals of 
promoting tribal financial independence and reducing the federal deficit, 
because profit from tobacco sales free of state tax has been essentially 
foreclosed, Indian Gaming operations have been reduced to profit-sharing 
with states and subject to constant expensive litigation, and the CSA 
prevents tribes from cultivating industrial hemp, one of the few crops that is 
sustainable in much of Indian Country.  
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In order to realize the federal goal of promoting tribal self-sufficiency 
while maintaining a balance between states and tribes in general, and in 
regard to the growing marijuana industry, the federal government must at 
the very least specify intended criminal and civil implications, and the role 
of tribes within federal legislation decriminalizing and taxing marijuana. 
Ideally, Congress will take advantage of the unique inconsistency between 
federal law and state conduct to enact a comprehensive regulatory 
marijuana scheme that simultaneously lifts the federal marijuana 
prohibition and designates a meaningful role for federally recognized tribes 
by providing a legally and fiscally sound means for interested tribes to 
viably enter and compete within the growing national marijuana market. 
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